World of warships double commander xp5/25/2023 ![]() PLA doctrinal writings, on the other hand, describe a more robust and multi-faceted operation. (There is a strong current of operations research number-crunching among Chinese military academics.) Many of the studies focus on traditional operations to intercept and board merchant ships, including the inevitable mathematical calculations of how large an area an intercept force can cover. Studies of international law and historical blockades examine the First and Second World Wars, the Cuban Missile Crisis, the US-Vietnam War, the Falklands War and others. How the Chinese discuss blockadeĬhinese theoretical writings discuss strategic blockade (战略封锁) as a major type of operation, on par with island landing operations, strategic counter-air attack and space warfare. This report will argue that while a Chinese blockade might begin with traditional stop-and-search actions, readily countered by a superior naval force, both Chinese operational doctrine and the military and geographic situation will drive them to a concept of operations vastly more difficult for US forces to counter. The discussion below will focus on the latter two options, where the blockade becomes the primary battlefield for the remainder of a long conflict. If not, however, the PLA would continue the fight by whatever means available, meaning an indefinite blockade to eventually compel surrender. Chinese leaders might be able to sell Party elites and the general public an interpretation where China had achieved a political victory despite the military failure, and in that case, it might be possible to reach some formula to end the conflict. That is true even if China wins, and the threat to regime survival is even greater if it is seen to have lost. Unlike the previous two forms, this blockade would continue for as long as necessary for China to prevail.Īs the fallback after a failed invasion: War with the United States would entail enormous costs for China and endanger every other national objective, including the Communist Party’s hold on power. An alternative course of action would be to forego the landing and impose the tightest blockade possible, slowly strangling Taiwan until it submits or collapses. Image: FacebookĪs an alternative to invasion: A landing of the size required to conquer Taiwan, especially in the face of vigorous US military intervention, would be of unprecedented scale and complexity with a high chance of failure. Both the US and China would incur heavy losses in a conflict. A limited blockade would be among the supporting lines of effort. Setting favorable conditions for the landing would require at least partial air, maritime, and information superiority around the landing operation. In that first category of coercive measures, the menu of options includes saber-rattling exercises (as seen last August) seizure of small Taiwan-controlled islands limited air and missile strikes and a limited, demonstrative blockade of Taiwan.Īs a prelude to invasion: If Beijing is determined to conquer Taiwan, then a major amphibious landing is one of its main options. ![]() The blockade in China’s calculusĪn integrated air, maritime, and information blockade of Taiwan appears in four different forms in the PLA’s range of options against Taiwan.Īs a coercive measure: We may divide potential Chinese military attacks against Taiwan into two major categories: on the one hand, actions to punish and coerce Taiwan, forcing it to change its behavior back to ways that are more acceptable to Beijing and on the other hand, actions to conquer Taiwan and compel its unification with the People’s Republic of China (PRC). In this author’s assessment, nothing the United States armed forces are doing or planning to do is sufficient to prevail in that conflict. In a serious military conflict over Taiwan, the kind of blockade China would impose would be vastly more difficult to counter. ![]() There is danger that the exercises we observed will foster a false belief that breaking a Chinese blockade would be a straightforward task easily within the capability of current and projected US forces. Chinese commentators emphasized that both the proximity to Taiwan ports and the encirclement of Taiwan were unprecedented for PLA exercises. Training events included establishing air superiority and conducting maritime and land strikes and anti-submarine warfare, with explicit reference to Taiwan targets and Taiwan forces, and the need to interdict US forces deploying into the area. Chinese forces established closure areas near Taiwan’s major ports for what the Chinese media called “joint blockade and joint support operations” (联合封控和联合保障行动). Maneuvers by the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in August 2022 marked the first time the PLA has openly signaled that a blockade of Taiwan is among the military courses of action for which it plans and trains.
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